A Deep Learning-Based Cyberattack Detection System for Transmission Protective Relays by Khaw, YM et al.
This is a repository copy of A Deep Learning-Based Cyberattack Detection System for 
Transmission Protective Relays.




Khaw, YM, Jahromi, AA, Arani, MFM et al. (3 more authors) (2020) A Deep Learning-
Based Cyberattack Detection System for Transmission Protective Relays. IEEE 
Transactions on Smart Grid. ISSN 1949-3053 
https://doi.org/10.1109/tsg.2020.3040361
© 2020 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be 
obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing 
this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for 
resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this 




Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
1
A Deep Learning-Based Cyberattack Detection
System for Transmission Protective Relays
Yew Meng Khaw, Amir Abiri Jahromi, Member, IEEE, Mohammadreza F. M. Arani, Member, IEEE, Scott
Sanner, Deepa Kundur, Fellow, IEEE, and Marthe Kassouf
Abstract—The digitalization of power systems over the past
decade has made the cybersecurity of substations a top priority
for regulatory agencies and utilities. Proprietary communication
protocols are being increasingly replaced by standardized and
interoperable protocols providing utility operators with remote
access and control capabilities at the expense of growing cy-
berattack risks. In particular, the potential of supply chain
cyberattacks is on the rise in industrial control systems. In this
environment, there is a pressing need for the development of
cyberattack detection systems for substations and in particular
protective relays, a critical component of substation operation.
This paper presents a deep learning-based cyberattack detection
system for transmission line protective relays. The proposed
cyberattack detection system is first trained with current and
voltage measurements representing various types of faults on
the transmission lines. The cyberattack detection system is then
employed to detect current and voltage measurements that are
maliciously injected by an attacker to trigger the transmission
line protective relays. The proposed cyberattack detection system
is evaluated under a variety of cyberattack scenarios. The results
demonstrate that a universal architecture can be designed for the
deep learning-based cyberattack detection systems in substations.
Index Terms—Cyberphysical systems, transmission protective




RITICAL infrastructures including electric power sys-
tems are undergoing a digital transformation and their
dependence on information technology is expected to signifi-
cantly increase in the coming years. The integration of infor-
mation technology (IT) with operational technology (OT) in
critical infrastructures improves efficiency, sustainability and
consumer-centricity at the expense of increased cyberattack
vulnerability [1], [2]. The high-profile cyberattacks against
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critical infrastructures in recent years like cyberattacks against
the Ukrainian power grid illustrate the increasing exposure
of these critical infrastructures to cyberattacks [3], [4]. These
have promoted the detection and mitigation of cyberattacks to
a top priority for governments and regulatory agencies as well
as utilities [5].
Substations are at the forefront of digital transformation in
electric power systems. The deployment of the IEC 61850
protocol in substations is expected to revolutionize the substa-
tion automation system by improving reliability, reducing costs
and allowing interoperability between intelligent electronic
devices (IEDs) while facilitating the realization of Internet of
Things through remote access to substation assets and IEDs
[6], [7]. Despite the unquestionable benefits of substation dig-
italization in automating and streamlining protection, control
and asset management, it introduces complex cybersecurity
concerns that need to be appropriately addressed [8]. This is
mainly because the substation communication protocols are
insecure as they must operate under the limited processing
capability of intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) as well as
various operational considerations such as speed, reliability,
user-friendliness and openness [9]. Moreover, the security-
by-obscurity philosophy that has traditionally been used as
a defensive strategy for proprietary information and commu-
nication technologies (ICT) in substations no longer applies
to emerging standards and interoperable communication pro-
tocols like IEC 61850 [10]. At the same time, the possibility
of supply chain cyberattacks against industrial control systems
(ICS), such as Stuxnet [11], [12], is a growing concern in the
utilities and regulatory agencies.
In order to address the growing cybersecurity concerns
in electric utilities, different standards and initiatives have
been launched by standards organizations like the International
Society of Automation (ISA) [13]–[15] and International Elec-
trotechnical Commission (IEC) [16], research institutes like
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) [17] and government
agencies including U.S. Department of Energy [18], [19] to
develop cybersecurity measures and tools for cyber-assets
in power systems. Moreover, the North American Electric
Reliability Corporation (NERC) has established and enforced
Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) standards to identify,
categorize and protect cyber-assets that are essential to the
reliable operation of the bulk electric system [20].
Transmission line protective relays are one of the most crit-
ical protection and control devices in substations. Coordinated
cyberattacks targeting these relays have the potential to cause
simultaneous tripping of multiple transmission lines and a
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widespread blackout [21]. As such, it is crucial to enhance the
cybersecurity of transmission line protective relays. Existing
research to address this problem can be classified as proposing
either novel relay logic, anomaly detection or rule-based
detection methods. Cyber-resilient logic designs have been
proposed in [22] and [23] respectively for distance protection
and line differential protective relays. A rule-based intrusion
detection system has been presented in [24] for the IEC
61850 protocol. In [25], anomaly detection systems have been
proposed for substation automation systems. An integrated
host- and network-based anomaly detection system has been
presented in [26] for substations. The semantics of sampled
value (SV) and Generic Object Oriented Substation Event
(GOOSE) messages have been employed in [27] to identify
intrusions, anomalies, or abnormal behaviors in the IEC 61850
protocol. The aforementioned anomaly detection systems can
successfully detect and mitigate some cyberattacks against
IEC 61850 GOOSE and SV communication packets as well
as IEDs by examining the logs of intruders’ footprints. Yet,
they are unable to detect new cyberattacks that continuously
evolve. A cyberattack can target the payload of communication
packets through a supply chain attack or a combined man-
in-the-middle (MITM) and false data injection (FDI) attack
that modify the sensor readings of current and voltage mea-
surements to trigger unwanted relay action while aiming to
maintain stealth. We assert that detection of such complex
attacks are better addressed through advanced data analytics.
In recent years, there has been a growing focus on the ap-
plication of machine learning for the detection and mitigation
of cyberattacks against power systems [28]–[30]. Nevertheless,
the application of machine learning for cybersecurity enhance-
ment of protective relays has received little or no attention.
Both misuse-based and anomaly-based techniques can be used
for cyberattack detection. The misuse-based methods employ
known signatures of cyberattacks; typically, such approaches
have the advantage that they can detect such known cyber-
attacks with high recall rates, but demonstrate limitations in
detecting previously unseen attacks. This is while anomaly-
based approaches rely on learning and baselining the normal
behaviour of power systems. The main merit of anomaly-
based techniques is their capability to detect zero-day attacks
[31]. Moreover, it is possible to obtain training data for
dynamic behaviors of power systems than the evolving and
clandestine signatures of cyberattacks. A machine learning-
based anomaly detection approach also removes the need to
manually enumerate specifications and rules based on the
communication protocol, as is required in specification-based
detection techniques.
Support vector machine and principal component analysis
have been used in [32] to detect stealthy attacks against state
estimation. The compromised meters have been detected in
[33] using an artificial intelligence-based method. In [34],
conditional deep belief network is applied to recognize be-
haviour patterns of FDI attacks using historical measurement
data. False data injection attacks against phasor measurement
units (PMU) have been detected in [35] using deep learning.
A semi-supervised method has been employed in [36] for
anomaly detection in an IEC 61850-based smart distribution
substation. A non-nested generalized exemplar and state ex-
traction method has been used in [37] for intrusion detection.
Machine learning-based data analytics have been employed in
[38] to identify the root causes of the transmission protection
mal-operation such as cyberattacks. Nevertheless, the method
presented in [38] has not been designed to detect or prevent
cyberattacks against transmission line protection in real-time.
This paper expands on the novel deep learning-based cy-
berattack detection system that we presented in [39] which
was limited to distance protective relays and symmetrical
three-phase faults. In this paper, we present a novel deep
learning-based cyberattack detection system for transmission
line protective relays including distance protective relays, over-
current protective relays and differential protective relays and
for multiple fault scenarios. A 1-dimensional convolutional
based autoencoder is used for cyberattack detection, leveraging
the strength of unsupervised learning to detect previously
unseen attacks. The proposed cyberattack detection system is
trained with current and voltage datasets representing different
types of faults occurring on the protected transmission line.
The cyberattack detection system is then employed to detect
current and voltage measurements that are tampered with by
an attacker to trigger the transmission protective relays. The
proposed cyberattack detection system is evaluated for various
cyberattacks including combined MITM and FDI attack, at-
tacks on instrument transformer tap settings and replay attack.
It is demonstrated that a well-tuned deep learning-based cy-
berattack detection system performs well for different types of
transmission protective relays which highlights the possibility
of designing a universal architecture for the deep learning-
based cyberattack detection systems in substations, eliminating
the need for the costly and time-consuming process of tuning
a model architecture for every combination of fault and relay
element types.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• A novel deep learning-based cyberattack detection system
with a universal architecture is proposed for detection and
mitigation of false tripping cyberattacks against transmis-
sion line protective relays in substations.
• The performance and validity of the proposed cyberattack
detection system is examined for the following:
– Various transmission line protective relays including
distance protective relays, overcurrent protective re-
lays and differential protective relays.
– Different types of faults including three-phase-
to-ground, two-phase-to-ground, single-phase-to-
ground, and phase-to-phase faults.
– Different cyberattack scenarios including 1) com-
bined MITM and FDI attack, 2) attacks on instru-
ment transformer tap settings, and 3) replay attack.
It is worth noting that the proposed method is different
from deep learning-based fault detection systems. The deep
learning-based fault detection systems replace the protective
relay logics for fault detection and isolation. This is while the
proposed method is used in conjunction with protective relay
elements to detect and mitigate false tripping cyberattacks







VT: Voltage Transformer CT: Current TransformerCB: Circuit Breaker




















Fig. 1. Architecture of IEC61850 substation automation system for transmis-
sion line protection.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The
modeling of cyberattacks against transmission line protective
relays is described in Section II. Section III presents the
proposed cyberattack detection system. The training, valida-
tion and testing steps of the proposed cyberattack detection
system are presented in Section IV. The simulation results are
provided in Section V. A brief discussion about the challenges
facing the development of machine learning-based cyberattack
detection systems for protective relays and directions for future
research are provided in Section VI before concluding the
paper in Section VII.
II. THE MODELING OF CYBERATTACKS AGAINST
TRANSMISSION LINE PROTECTIVE RELAYS
Transmission lines are normally protected by primary/main
and back-up protections in power systems using the principles
of distance, overcurrent and differential relaying. High-speed
protection is an essential requirement for transmission lines be-
cause it preserves system stability, reduces damage to critical
assets, improves power quality, and simplifies protective relay
coordination. This has motivated the use of communication-
assisted protection including current differential and pilot
protection as the primary/main protection for transmission
lines. This is while the step-distance and overcurrent protection
remain as the widely used back-up protection for transmission
lines.
The architecture of IEC 61850 substation automation system
for transmission line protection is illustrated in Fig. 1. The
merging units (MU) collect the analog measurements from
the current transformers (CT) and voltage transformers (VT)
and perform the analog-to-digital conversion. The MUs then
transmit the measurements to the IEDs over the IEC 61850
substation LAN using SV messages. The transmission line pro-
tection logics for distance, overcurrent and differential relaying
are implemented in the IEDs. The current differential and pilot
protection logics receive the required information from the
remote substation through the inter-substation communication
network by GOOSE and SV messages.
It is worth noting that IEC 62351, a family of standards on
data and communications security for power system manage-
ment, was introduced to address the cybersecurity concerns
associated with the IEC 61850 protocol [16]. Specifically,
the implementation of IEC 62351 will enhance the overall
cybersecurity of the substation automation system by incor-
porating confidentiality and integrity measures like role-based
access control that restricts unnecessary permissions, message
level authentications and encryption mechanisms. Yet, no en-
cryption mechanism was specified in the IEC 62351 standard
for SV messages because of the time critical nature of these
messages [40]. Instead, according to the IEC 62351-6 standard,
the cybersecurity for information exchange of these time-
critical messages relies on the supposition that SV messages
are restricted to a logical substation LAN. Consequently, a
breach on the substation LAN is sufficient to compromise
power system applications that utilize SV messages. Moreover,
the majority of the cyberattacks considered in our paper target
operational technology data rather than information technol-
ogy data. Authentication or other security measures proposed
in the IEC 62351 standard would not prevent cyberattacks that
are considered in the paper as discussed below.
The objective of the cyberattacker in this paper is to cause
the false tripping of transmission lines through falsifying the
measurements from the instrument transformers to the trans-
mission line protective relays. In other words, the particular
type of cyberattack considered is one that aims to deceive
protective relays into incorrectly assessing that a fault exists
leading to unwanted breaker action. That is, no fault actually
exists, but the attack induces the protection system to pick
up as if there is. Hence, we aim to distinguish the presence
of actual faults from these cyberattacks that attempt to mimic
and fabricate the presence of faults that do not exist. Three
scenarios are considered here to achieve this objective. The
first scenario is executed through the process bus while the
remaining two scenarios are executed by compromising a
merging unit as illustrated in Fig. 1.
A. Attack Scenario 1
In the first scenario, we assume that a cyberattacker has
remote access to the substation automation system through
a malicious device which is connected to the process bus.
The cyberattacker is assumed to recruit a substation employee
who has authority to access communication devices in the
substation to install the malicious device. The cyberattacker
with access to the process bus through the malicious device
disrupts the flow of SV packets from the merging unit to the
IEDs and forwards the SV packets with falsified payloads
to the IEDs using a combination of MITM and FDI attack.
Specifically, the attacker injects random false data with the
appropriate magnitude, thus, coercing the transmission line
protective relays to issue false tripping commands. When
targeting an overcurrent relay, the attacker injects random
current measurements with large magnitude to mimic a fault
condition. Similarly, with a differential relay as a target,
the attacker injects random current measurements with large
magnitude while also ensuring the differential relay receives
current measurements of different magnitude from both termi-
nals of the transmission line. For the false tripping of distance
relay, the attacker injects both current measurements of high
magnitude and voltage measurements of low magnitude.
B. Attack Scenario 2
In the second scenario, we assume that the attacker has
remote or physical access to the merging unit and modifies the
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settings of the CT/VT through the merging unit. The attack
is assumed to be executed by an insider with access to the
substation automation system or through a remote access to
the process bus similar to the first scenario. The attacker could
have recruited a disgruntled internal employee or may have
obtained stolen or leaked legitimate operator credentials that
allow remote access to the substation communication network.
The tap settings of the instrument transformers allow users
to change the voltage and current ratios between the primary
and secondary windings of the transformers. For example, an
attacker can change the tap settings of a current transformer
such that a larger current is observed downstream to the
current transformer. The attacker can also tamper with the tap
settings of a voltage transformer such that the protective relays
receive voltage measurements of lower magnitude, mimicking
the voltage behaviour in a fault condition.
C. Attack Scenario 3
In the third scenario, we assume that a malware installed on
the merging unit is used to perform a replay attack by replacing
measurements from the CT/VT with previously recorded fault
measurements to cause false tripping of the transmission line
protective relays. The malware can be installed on the merging
unit through a supply chain attack or a threat agent with
physical or remote access to the substation automation system.
The malware can then eavesdrop and disrupt the information
exchange between the instrument transformer and merging unit
as well as between the merging unit and IED. This allows the
attacker to record current and voltage measurements during
fault scenario, which can be injected at a later time as a replay
attack.
III. THE PROPOSED CYBERATTACK DETECTION SYSTEM
The objective of the proposed cyberattack detection system
is to detect patterns in the measurements from instrument
transformers, i.e., CTs and VTs, that do not conform to the
normal behavior of measurements. Note that the notion of
normal behavior of measurements in this paper includes both
power system fault-free dynamics and dynamics during power
system faults. One distinction of the proposed approach is that
patterns in OT data are harnessed for the purpose of anomaly
detection. Hence, in contrast to typical IT intrusion detection
approaches that make use of communication packet semantics
or logs of intruder footprints, we make use of data closer to the
physical impacts of the attacks. Hence, time-series current and
voltage measurements at the process bus level of substations
are the inputs employed for data analytics.
A. Configuration of the Proposed Cyberattack Detection Sys-
tem in Substations
Anomaly detection systems using machine learning ap-
proaches have received considerable attention in recent years
in various application domains including cybersecurity [41]–
[43]. Several factors such as the nature of the input data, the
availability of the labeled datasets as well as the constraints
and requirements induced by the application domain determine
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Fig. 2. The configuration of the proposed cyberattack detection system (CDS)
in a substation.
detection. As stated above, time-series current and voltage
measurements at the process bus level of substations are the
inputs employed for in the CDS. Moreover, traditional IEDs
and automation devices in substations are resource constrained
devices with just enough memory and computational power to
perform their tasks. This prevents the implementation of the
power and resource demanding cyberattack detection systems
that use machine learning-based methods within the IEDs and
automation systems in substations. Yet, IEDs and automation
devices with more powerful processors may emerge in the
coming years with the ability to implement machine learning-
based methods in order to respond to the growing need of
power utilities to leverage machine learning techniques in their
system operations. Finally, the evolving and clandestine nature
of cyberattacks as well as their rarity against protective relays
limit the possibility of obtaining and effectively modeling
these anomalous behaviour in contrast to normal behaviour
in substations for which there is significantly more data and
more predictable characteristics. In this environment, semi-
supervised and unsupervised machine learning approaches are
in a superior position for cyberattack detection in contrast to
supervised machine learning approaches.
Considering the aforementioned factors, we propose a
centralized deep learning-based cyberattack detection system
(CDS) for transmission line protective relays performed by ad-
ditional physical devices with sufficient computational power
separate from the IEDs as illustrated in Fig. 2. The cyberattack
detection system is external to the IEDs and MUs within
the substation and is connected to them via the process bus
and inter-substation communication network. The proposed
cyberattack detection system functions in two steps: 1) the
offline training, validation and testing step and 2) the real-
time operational step. In the offline training, validation and
testing step, the proposed model learns the normal behaviour
of the current and voltage measurements during transmission
line faults. The cyberattack detection system will go live
within the substation when calibration through the offline
training, validation and testing step is finalized. In the real-time
operational step, the cyberattack detection system identifies
anomalous measurements that do not conform to the normal
behavior of measurements. The cyberattack detection system
has two modes of operation in real-time: 1) cyberattack detec-
tion mode, and 2) cyberattack detection and mitigation mode.
In the detection mode, the cyberattack detection system only
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generates an alarm after detecting anomalous measurements
and does not intervene with the functionality of the protective
relays in the IED. This is while, in the detection and mitigation
mode, the cyberattack detection system sends commands to the
IEDs to block the anomalous measurements in order to avoid
transmission line false tripping.
It is worth noting that the proposed cyberattack detection
system classifies any anomalous measurement as a cyberat-
tack. This means that in detection mode, an alarm is generated,
or in detection and mitigation mode, commands are sent
to the IEDs to block anomalous measurements. In typical
anomaly detection frameworks, the type of anomaly is not
distinguished because they are not explicitly modeled. There
are advantages to this treatment because new cyberattacks
previously unknown can be accounted for as long as they
involve anomalous measurements. If the source of anomalous
measurements is to be distinguished, offline post forensic
analysis like the one proposed in [38] is required.
B. A Deep Learning Autoencoder-based Cyberattack Detec-
tion System
We now outline an unsupervised deep learning approach to
anomaly detection using an autoencoder. Such an approach
allows for the detection of zero-day attacks and removes the
need to manually enumerate specifications and rules based
on a specific communication protocol and cyberattack type.
A deep learning approach also allows us to leverage the
availability of a large volume of high-fidelity data that can be
obtained for model training. The autoencoder consists of two
parts; encoder and decoder. The encoder, f , compresses the
input data, x, to a latent space, z, with dimensions typically
smaller than the input data. The decoder, g, reconstructs an
estimate of the input data from the latent space z. As the
autoencoder is trained to be an identity system, the latent
space z of smaller dimensionality must necessarily capture
the most salient features of the input. Since the latent space
is particular to the type of training data, inputs deviating from
the training dataset will result in high reconstruction errors
and flagged as anomalous data. The reconstruction error is
computed from the mean squared error (MSE) between the
reconstructed output and the input data to the autoencoder.
Different types of models can be used in the autoencoder
such as a fully-connected network, recurrent neural network
and convolutional neural network. The reader should note that
autoencoders are generally considered unsupervised methods
because although labels of the normal training data are known,
they are not explicitly incorporated during the training process
as the original voltage and current input itself is also employed
in the role of the labels. The objective of the autoencoder
is to build a model of the normal data with the reasoning
that data which is abnormal cannot be properly reproduced
(i.e., autoencoded) by an autoencoder trained on only the
normal data. As the autoencoder itself does not explicitly
predict normal or abnormal labels, the autoencoder is generally
considered unsupervised.
In this paper, a 1-dimensional convolutional based autoen-
coder is used for the cyberattack detection system. Here,
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Fig. 3. A 1-dimensional convolution operation on 10 measurement samples
with a convolution filter F of length M = 4.
convolution stages that consist of sliding a filter kernel over
the data set and applying a dot product. The output of the
convolution operation is given in (1).






where Y denotes the output of the convolution operation, X
denotes the 1-dimensional data input, F denotes the convolu-
tion filter of length M, ’∗’ denotes the convolutional operator
and i denotes the input data index. The convolution operation
is illustrated in Fig. 3. The CNN model allows for parameter
sharing in F which reduces the total number of trainable
parameters, resulting in computational savings during model
training with less memory requirements and higher statistical
efficiency [42].
For the encoder section of the cyberattack detection sys-
tem that embeds the input into a low-dimensional latent
space where similar inputs should embed near each other,
we use a neural network consisting of interleaved layers of
convolutional operations followed by a nonlinear activation
and max pooling [42]. An example of a common nonlinear
activation function is the rectified linear unit (ReLU) which is
a piecewise linear function as defined in (2).
σ(x) = max(x, 0) (2)
The pooling layer has the effect of reducing the input dimen-
sion by downsampling the input. Common approaches include
average pooling and max pooling layers which slide a small
window at a given stride, taking the average and maximum
value respectively within the window to produce a downsized
dataset. In the decoder section of the autoencoder, the data
in the latent space is expanded back to the original input
dimensions. Our decoder consists of convolution operations
interleaved with 1-dimensional upsampling layers [45]. We
provide an example of a 1-dimensional upsampling operation
with an upsampling factor of 2 in Fig. 4.
IV. TRAINING, VALIDATION AND TESTING OF THE
CYBERATTACK DETECTION SYSTEM
Different types of faults including three-phase-to-ground
faults, two-phase-to-ground faults, single-phase-to-ground
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Fig. 5. The IEEE PSRC D6 benchmark test system.
lines. Naturally, the signatures of each of these faults are
distinct. Moreover, the types of input data used by different
protective relays such as distance, overcurrent and differential
protective relays are different. For instance, distance relays
make use of both current and voltage measurements while
overcurrent and differential relays rely solely on current mea-
surements.
The differences between the types of faults and inputs to
the protective relays render it impossible to train a single deep
learning model for all types of faults and protective relays. Yet,
we posit that a universal architecture can be designed for the
deep-learning model in the cyberattack detection system. The
implementation of a universal architecture in the cyberattack
detection system eliminates the cumbersome need for opti-
mizing the architecture for every variety and combination of
faults and protective relays. Hence, in this paper, we consider
a universal architecture for the deep-learning model and train
it for each type of fault and protective relay separately. This
approach results in a deep-learning model with the universal
architecture, with different model weights for each combina-
tion of faults and protective relays. Each of the deep learning
models becomes active by the activation of the corresponding
protective relay element and remains inactive for the activation
of all other protective relay elements. Note that the training,
validation and testing steps are conducted offline. Therefore,
the computational complexity and execution times are not
limiting factors.
A. Transmission Test System
Fig. 5 illustrates the IEEE power system relaying committee
(PSRC) D6 benchmark test system [46]. The test system
connects a power plant with four 250 MVA generator units
to a 230 kV transmission network through two parallel 500
kV transmission lines. The test system is comprised of three
substations. Substation A connects the power plant to the 500
kV transmission lines. Substation B is a switching substation
and is located 280 km from substation A. Substation C is
located 220 km from Substation B and models the connection
to a 230 kV transmission system that is modeled as an infinite
bus. The transmission lines are protected by the principles of
distance, overcurrent and differential protection.
B. Training Dataset
The transmission test system in Fig. 5 is simulated in OPAL-
RT HYPERSIM to generate training datasets. The simulations
are performed for a duration of 200 milliseconds with the
fault initiating randomly between t=100 ms to t=120 ms. The
starting time of the fault is varied between t=100 ms to t=120
ms in the simulations to ensure fault occurs at different parts
of the current and voltage waveforms. Note that the period
of one cycle is approximately 16.7 ms in a 60 Hz power
system. Moreover, the generation levels and fault locations
on the transmission line L1 are changed in each simulation
to generate datasets under different operating conditions and
fault location scenarios. The generation levels of G1-G2 and
G3-G4 are varied in unison between 300 MW to 400 MW
with a step size of 10 MW. The fault location is changed
along the transmission line L1 with a step size of 10 km.
The simulations are performed for three-phase-to-ground, two-
phase-to-ground, single-phase-to-ground, and phase-to-phase
faults. The fault impedance is assumed to be zero. In total,
50,820 simulations are performed to generate training datasets
for each type of fault.
The measurements are collected for all three-phases. The
current measurements are collected from CT1 and CT2 in
Fig. 5 and the voltage measurements are collected from VT1.
The measurements are collected at the sampling rate of 4800
samples per second to comply with IEC 61850-9-2 standard
for SV packet specifications [47]. As such, each simulation
run contains 960 samples per measurement per phase.
C. Training and Optimization of the Autoencoder Architecture
The 1-dimensional convolutional based autoencoder de-
scribed in Section III-B is trained with three-phase measure-
ments corresponding to the inputs of the associated protective
relay. The autoencoder associated with the overcurrent pro-
tective relay is trained with three-phase current measurements
from CT1. The autoencoder associated with the distance relay
is trained with three-phase current and voltage measurements
from CT1 and VT1 and the autoencoder associated with the
differential relay is trained with three-phase current measure-
ments from CT1 and CT2.
The autoencoder is trained with 70% of the 50,820 simu-
lations. The validation and test datasets each comprises 15%
of the 50,820 simulations. An important parameter for autoen-
coder training is the input data length, i.e., the number of input
samples fed to the autoencoder. In this paper, a sliding window
of 50 ms, i.e., 240 samples of current/voltage measurements
for each phase, is fed to the autoencoder as input. As such,
each window consists of 3 cycles of measurements. Thus,
the 200 ms simulation data is split into sliding windows of
50 ms data. As the sliding window slides over the entire
simulation sample, the autoencoder is trained. Note that data
standardization is performed before the data is fed to the
autoencoder. Consider a training dataset D that contains the
7
measurement points, x1, x2, ..., xN . In data standardization,
the data for each measurement type is scaled to unit variance
and zero mean as given in (3)-(5) where the mean, µ, and

























The cyberattack detection system is further trained to reduce
the loss function, which is the MSE between the input and the
reconstructed output of the autoencoder as given in (6).
L = ||g(f(x))− x||22 (6)
ADAM, a state-of-the-art stochastic gradient-based optimiza-
tion algorithm [48], is used for model training to minimize the
loss function. ADAM employs an adaptive learning rate and
momentum via a moving average of the gradients and squared
gradients, for faster convergence over a straightforward gradi-
ent descent algorithm.
A universal architecture is used in this paper for the cy-
berattack detection system as discussed in Section IV. The
architecture is optimized via grid search for different number
of layers, number of convolution filters and pooling size. The
architecture is optimized in this paper to obtain the highest
recall rate for the replay attack scenario instead of the lowest
loss value. This is because the lowest loss value does not nec-
essarily result in the best cyberattack detection performance.
The final architecture is chosen based on the highest recall rate
observed in the validation dataset. Using labelled replay attack
measurement samples during the validation step allows the
selection of a better tuned model architecture at the expense of
slightly biasing the performance of the cyberattack detection
system towards the replay attack scenario. Nevertheless, the
cyberattack detection system is observed to perform well in
all other attack scenarios considered in this paper.
The final architecture is summarized in Table I and il-
lustrated in Fig. 6. In all convolutional layers, we used a
convolution filter size of 10, convolutional stride length of
1 and used ReLU as the activation function. When choosing
the final model weights, we chose the weights at the epoch
that results in the highest recall rate within 100 epochs.
For example, in the three-phase-to-ground fault scenario, we
used 80 epochs for the overcurrent relay, 70 epochs for the
distance relay and 60 epochs for the differential relay. This is
commonly known as early stopping. Again, this choice of the
final model weights is done based on the validation dataset.





1. Convolution 32 filters 13. Convolution 256 filters
2. Convolution 32 filters 14. Convolution 256 filters
3. Max Pooling Pool Size 2 15. Upsampling Factor 6
4. Convolution 64 filters 16. Convolution 128 filters
5. Convolution 64 filters 17. Convolution 128 filters
6. Max Pooling Pool Size 4 18. Upsampling Factor 5
7. Convolution 128 filters 19. Convolution 64 filters
8. Convolution 128 filters 20. Convolution 64 filters
9. Max Pooling Pool Size 5 21. Upsampling Factor 4
10. Convolution 256 filters 22. Convolution 32 filters
11. Convolution 256 filters 23. Convolution 32 filters
12. Max Pooling Pool Size 6 24. Upsampling Factor 2
25. Convolution 3 filters
26. Convolution 3 filters
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we examine the performance of the pro-
posed deep learning-based cyberattack detection system. Three
cyberattack scenarios including 1) combined MITM and FDI
attack, 2) attack on instrument transformer tap settings, and 3)
replay attack are considered. In each scenario, we investigate
the performance of the cyberattack detection system for dif-
ferent types of faults and different protective relay principles.
Anomalous or attack data are data that deviates from
normal behavior as recognized by the cyberattack detection
system during model training. These attack cases represent
rare occurrences resulting in an imbalanced dataset with
very small number of positive cases. Using accuracy as our
performance metric is therefore inapt. Consider a dataset with
1000 measurement samples with only 1 attack sample. A naive
cyberattack detection system that always classifies an input
as negative or normal will achieve an accuracy of 99.9%. As
such, the precision and recall metrics are employed to measure
the performance of the proposed cyberattack detection system.
precision =
# True Positive




# True Positive + # False Negative
(8)
True Positive represents cyberattacks that are correctly
detected by the cyberattack detection system. False Positive
represents measurements with normal behaviour that are in-
correctly classified as a cyberattack. False Negative repre-
sents cyberattacks that are not detected by the cyberattack
detection system. True Negative represents measurements with
normal behaviour that are correctly classified as legitimate
measurements. # represents the count of each event. Therefore,
precision is the fraction of attack classifications made by
the cyberattack detection model that is correct. Recall is the
fraction of actual attacks that are ”recalled”, i.e., correctly
classified as attacks by the cyberattack detection system.
As discussed in Section III-B, the deep learning-based
cyberattack detection system is capable of reconstructing mea-
surements with low reconstruction error when applied to data
exhibiting normal characteristics. This is while reconstruction
error is high for anomalous measurements that deviate from
the training data. Hence, a threshold for the reconstruction
error can be set for cyberattack detection. The threshold for
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Fig. 6. The architecture of the proposed cyberattack detection system where the input/output dimensions depend on the type of the protective relay.
TABLE II
PERFORMANCE OF THE CDS: RANDOM FDI ATTACK
Fault Scenario Relay Type Precision Recall
Single-Phase-to-Ground (A-G) Overcurrent 100% 100%
Differential 100% 100%
Distance 100% 100%
Two-Phase-to-Ground (A-B-G) Overcurrent 100% 100%
Differential 100% 100%
Distance 100% 100%
Three-Phase-to-Ground (A-B-C-G) Overcurrent 100% 100%
Differential 100% 100%
Distance 100% 100%
Phase-to-Phase (A-B) Overcurrent 100% 100%
Differential 100% 100%
Distance 100% 100%
Three-Phase (A-B-C) Overcurrent 100% 100%
Differential 100% 100%
Distance 100% 100%
between the input and the reconstructed output observed with
the training dataset. This conservatively high threshold ensures
low false positive rates.
A. Combined Man-In-The-Middle and Random False Data
Injection Attack
In this scenario, we assume that a cyberattacker has remote
access to the substation automation system through a malicious
device which is connected to the process bus. We further
assume that the cyberattacker understands the principles of
transmission line protective relays but does not have knowl-
edge about the dynamics of the transmission network under
attack. Thus, the cyberattacker injects random measurements
to the process bus to trigger the transmission line protective
relays. In the case of the overcurrent relay, the cyberattacker
injects current measurements with large magnitudes to the
process bus. In the case of the distance relay, the cyberattacker
injects current and voltage measurements with high and low
magnitudes respectively to the process bus to represent a fault.
In the case of the differential relay, the cyberattacker injects
different current measurements with high magnitudes to the
process bus. The performance of the cyberattack detection
system considering different types of faults and protective
relay principles for the combined MITM and FDI attack is
summarized in Table II. A sample of measurements during a
combined MITM and FDI attack on the overcurrent relay is
illustrated in Fig. 7. As illustrated in Fig. 7, the autoencoder
reconstructs the injected false data with high error.
Fig. 7. Reconstruction of the measurements during a combined MITM and
random FDI attack on the overcurrent relay.
B. Tampering of Instrument Transformer Tap Settings
In the second scenario, we assume that the attacker has
remote or physical access to the merging unit and modifies
the settings of the CT/VT through the merging unit. In the
case of overcurrent relay, the attacker changes the tap setting
of the current transformer CT1 such that a large current
magnitude is seen by the overcurrent relay. In the case of
the distance relay, the attacker changes the tap settings of
current transformer CT1 and voltage transformer VT1 such
that it triggers the distance relay. In the case of differential
relay, the cyberattacker changes the tap settings of the current
transformers CT1 and CT2 to trigger the differential relay. The
performance of the cyberattack detection system considering
different types of faults and protective relay principles for
the attacks against the instrument transformer tap settings is
summarized in Table III. A sample of measurements during
a cyberattack on the instrument transformer tap settings to
trigger a differential protective relay is illustrated in Fig. 8.
As illustrated in Fig. 8, the autoencoder poorly reconstructs
the measurements resulting in successful detection of the
cyberattack due to significant deviation of the attack data from
normal behavior.
C. Replay Attack
In the third scenario, we assume that a malware inside
the merging unit performs a replay attack by replacing the
measurements from CT/VT with previously recorded measure-
ments to cause false trippings of the protective relays. We
considered various scenarios ranging from unsynchronized to
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TABLE III
PERFORMANCE OF THE CDS: ATTACKS AGAINST INSTRUMENT
TRANSFORMER TAP SETTINGS
Fault Scenario Relay Type Precision Recall
Single-Phase-to-Ground (A-G) Overcurrent 100% 100%
Differential 100% 100%
Distance 100% 100%
Two-Phase-to-Ground (A-B-G) Overcurrent 100% 100%
Differential 100% 100%
Distance 100% 100%
Three-Phase-to-Ground (A-B-C-G) Overcurrent 100% 100%
Differential 100% 100%
Distance 100% 100%
Phase-to-Phase (A-B) Overcurrent 100% 100%
Differential 100% 100%
Distance 100% 100%
Three-Phase (A-B-C) Overcurrent 100% 100%
Differential 100% 100%
Distance 100% 100%
Fig. 8. Reconstruction of the measurements during an attack against the
instrument transformer tap settings to trigger the differential protective relay.
fully synchronized injection of the actual fault measurements
to cause false line tripping. Note that the replay attack assumes
a very strong capability on the part of the attacker. The
performance of the cyberattack detection system considering
different types of faults and protective relay principles for the
replay attack is summarized in Table IV. A sample of the
measurements during a replay attack against the distance relay
is illustrated in Fig. 9. As illustrated in Fig. 9, the autoencoder
poorly reconstructs the measurements resulting in successful
detection of the cyberattack. It should be noted that in the case
of a fully-synchronized replay attack, the proposed cyberattack
detection system was not able to detect the attacks. In such
attack scenarios, the measurements received is essentially the
same as measurements received in real-fault conditions.
TABLE IV
PERFORMANCE OF THE CDS: REPLAY ATTACK
Fault Scenario Relay Type Precision Recall
Single-Phase-to-Ground (A-G) Overcurrent 100% 95.2%
Differential 100% 91.0%
Distance 100% 96.1%
Two-Phase-to-Ground (A-B-G) Overcurrent 100% 92.4%
Differential 100% 82.1%
Distance 100% 95.4%
Three-Phase-to-Ground (A-B-C-G) Overcurrent 100% 91.7%
Differential 100% 88.8%
Distance 100% 94.5%
Phase-to-Phase (A-B) Overcurrent 100% 93.3%
Differential 100% 88.5%
Distance 100% 87.4%
Three-Phase (A-B-C) Overcurrent 100% 93.8%
Differential 100% 88.4%
Distance 100% 95.7%
Fig. 9. Reconstruction of the measurements during a replay attack on the
distance relay.
D. Computational Complexity of the Proposed Cyberattack
Detection System
The proposed cyberattack detection system was able to
detect the cyberattacks approximately 25 ms after the starting
point of the cyberattack i.e., after receiving 120 samples of
falsified current/voltage measurements. Moreover, it takes the
autoencoder slightly under 4 ms to reconstruct the measure-
ments using i7-9700K CPU with RTX2080 GPU. This sums
up to a minimum real-time delay of 29 ms in processing the
data, slightly less than 2 cycles. It is worth noting that the op-
erating time of the cyberattack detection system may become
larger than the operating time of commercial protective relays
[50]. Thus, further investigation is needed to ensure that the
sensitivity of protective relays will not be compromised by the
proposed cyberattack detection system.
As discussed previously in Section IV-C, a sliding win-
dow of 50 ms (or 3 cycles) equivalent to 240 samples of
current/voltage measurements for each phase, is consecutively
fed in real-time to the autoencoder as input for possible cy-
berattack detection after the system becomes active. Moreover,
the proposed cyberattack detection system needs less than two
cycles of processing time to distinguish a cyberattack from a
legitimate fault. Therefore, a buffer with a capacity to capture
5 cycles (400 samples per phase) of current and voltage
measurements,which is practical and reasonable, would be
sufficient to enable real-time operation.
VI. DISCUSSION
The development of deep learning-based cyberattack de-
tection systems for improving the cybersecurity of protective
relays in substations is at its embryonic stage. Despite the
promising results obtained in this paper, several open chal-
lenges should be addressed before it can be applied to real
systems. The first is related to the scarcity of fault data in
substations that is required to train the cyberattack detection
system. One can overcome this challenge by developing dy-
namical models that represent the real substations in time-
domain simulators and validating the dynamical models with
data from the fault recorders in substations. We emphasize that
it is impossible to develop machine learning-based cyberattack
detection systems for protective relays without access to high
fidelity training datasets. Thus, the development of accurate
time-domain dynamical models of substations is the essential
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first step for the advancement of machine learning-based
cyberattack detection systems.
There are numerous scenarios and practical considerations
that should be taken into account before implementing the
proposed model in practice. For instance, one needs to in-
vestigate the impact of scenarios such as current transformer
saturation, the existence of short lines, in-feeds, out-feeds,
different fault impedances, varying penetration of distributed
energy resources to see how these scenarios would impact the
performance of the proposed model. Moreover, several con-
siderations such as different transmission network topologies,
communication packet loss and noise should be taken into
account. For digital substations, an IEC 61850-9-2 merging
unit publishes 80 SV packets per cycle in a 60 Hz power
system, which means that measurements are transmitted every
208.3 microseconds. Protective relays are designed such that
they transition to an offline status if more than two consecutive
SV packets are missed [51]. This means packet loss will not
be the limiting factor as the protective relays will no longer
be in service under these conditions. Moreover, digital com-
munication systems are designed such that noise is minimized
with various filters commonly employed in industrial devices
like IEDs and MUs to further reduce any effect of noise on
the data [52]. Hence, the impact of noise and packet loss are
neglected in this paper.
Another interesting research direction is to examine the
cybersecurity of the proposed cyberattack detection system.
While the proposed cyberattack detection system addresses the
cybersecurity vulnerabilities of protective relays, its addition
may present an additional attack surface which needs further
investigation. An attacker may target the proposed cyberattack
detection system through the process bus to perform attacks
against protective relays and IEDs. Yet, cyberattackers with
access to the process bus can directly target the protective re-
lays without the need to compromise the proposed cyberattack
detection system. Moreover, authentication can be used for the
output signals of the proposed cyberattack detection system to
improve cybersecurity [53]. This is while it is impossible to
use authentication for SV packets considering the large number
of SV packets that should be processed by an IED in each
cycle, i.e., 80 packets per cycle in a 60 Hz system.
Last but not least, it is important to highlight that there
is no one-size-fits-all solution to the cybersecurity challenges
of industrial control systems like substation protection and
control. The cybersecurity challenges in these systems can
only be overcome by considering a holistic approach and
implementing layered protective measures and defence-in-
depth models.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper presented a deep-learning based cyberattack
detection system for transmission line protective relays. The
proposed cyberattack detection system is trained with mea-
surements representing different types of faults. Moreover,
the cyberattack detection system is trained with different
sets of inputs depending on the principle of the protective
relay under study such as distance, overcurrent or differential
protective relays. The simulation results verified the capability
of the proposed cyberattack detection system in identifying
different types of cyberattacks including 1) combined MITM
and FDI attack, 2) tampering of instrument transformer tap
settings, and 3) replay attack. The simulation results further
highlighted that a universal architecture can be designed for
the deep-learning model in the cyberattack detection system.
The implementation of such a universal architecture eliminates
the cumbersome need for optimizing the architecture for each
type of fault and protective relay and significantly facilitates
the development of the cyberattack detection system for the
protective relays in substations. The challenges facing the
development of machine learning-based cyberattack detection
systems for protective relays and directions for future research
have been further discussed.
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